

F154K-E2827

MEMORANDUM

NSS, Army, DOS, OSD, and DIA
review(s) completed

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
June 4, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge *JHH*

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting, Thursday, June 4, 1970

Items for discussion at this meeting include:



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-- Proposed operations in South Laos and Northeast Cambodia.

-- The Green Triangle situation.



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-- Provision of captured Communist arms to the Cambodians. ✓

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-- Indonesian military assistance to Cambodia.



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3. Proposed Operations in South Laos and Northeast Thailand (Tab 4).

-- Following the June 2 WSAG meeting State agreed to draft a cable to COMUSMACV to do a study covering guerrilla operations in South Laos and Northeast Thailand. This has been done, in accordance with changes proposed in the original draft made at the WSAG meeting.

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-- In addition, CIA has been tasked to do a study of significant Chinese Communist reaction which could be taken into account in modifying or redirecting military action.

There would appear to be no further questions needed on this issue at this time, unless others at the meeting should raise them.

4. The Green Triangle Situation.

-- You agreed with others at the June 2 WSAG meeting that Abrams' judgment on the inadvisability of supporting Cambodian forces in the Green Triangle area of Northeastern Cambodia. Instructions were sent to Rives to pass this decision on in such a way as to emphasize the positive aspects of what we were doing, e.g., providing air support for Cambodian forces in this region through June 30, and expressing sympathetic understanding of Lon Nol's position. This was done in order to avoid any damage to Lon Nol's morale or to our relationship with him.

-- This matter was badly handled; the Defense Attaché went to Lon Nol on his own before our instructions arrived and passed on Abrams' decision. Rives left this matter in the Defense Attaché's hands on the grounds that the matter was best handled in military channels. (See cable at Tab 4.)

-- In the incoming cable at Tab 4, Phnom Penh wondered if consideration should not be given to the possible use of Cambodian bases in the Green Triangle as forward areas from which the Cambodian Army could possibly harass LOC's at some future date.

Questions which you may wish to address:

-- Should Rives be told that matters involving crucial decisions affecting the morale of Lon Nol should not be handled solely in military channels ?

-- Should reconsideration be given to support for Cambodian forces in the Green Triangle in order to permit operations to be staged from this region against LOC's ?

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- You directed in the June 2 WSAG meeting that a study be prepared on the total costs to the U.S. of all the support calls listed above. This is now underway. It is presently anticipated that the study will be completed by the middle of next week to cover total costs in FY 71. No further questions appear necessary at this time unless others should wish to raise them.

6. Provision of Captured Communist Arms to the Cambodians.

- Lon Nol has indicated that he wants us to take action on turning over arms captured in the Communist caches to his forces. He has offered to check the amounts recovered against Cambodian lists to facilitate such a turn-over, and to see if we have missed anything. (See cable from Phnom Penh at Tab 5.)
- There seems to be some hint in this cable that the ARVN wants merely to "share" the captured arms with the Cambodians rather than to turn them all over.

You may wish to raise these questions:

- What has been done, if anything, to transfer captured arms to the Cambodians? Is there any way in which this matter could be expedited? Would U.S. assistance be required?
- Is there any reason why these arms should be "shared" with the ARVN, rather than be turned over in toto to the Cambodians?

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7. Indonesian Military Assistance to Cambodia.

- The President has directed that we should encourage the Indonesians to provide arms aid to Cambodia, and that we should make up Indonesian arms stocks depleted by this exercise. You passed on this directive to the WSAG members.
- State has drafted a cable to Djakarta on converting Indonesian ammunition manufacturing facilities (presumably the Arms Factory at Bandung) to produce AK-47 ammunition for Cambodia. (See Tab 6). This cable calls for a study of the feasibility of such a conversion, and says that we will send one or two qualified people from our side to discuss the technical aspects. It says also that we would be willing to "help" meet the costs involved through a mutually agreed offsetting arrangement. It stresses the urgency of this matter.

Questions which you may wish to address:

- Where do we stand on the matter of Indonesian arms aid to Cambodia ? Have the Indonesians made a firm proposal ?
- What would we need to make up in the way of replacements for arms sent to Cambodia ? How would we arrange to accomplish this -- via our MAP to Indonesia, or through some other program ?
- Is the draft cable to Djakarta on production of AK-47 ammunition agreeable ? (This is a positive approach. We would suggest, however, a minor change in the wording of the first sentence to delete the words "how big and [how expensive] a job conversion would be" and substitute "what conversion would entail." State appears to be unduly concerned about the expense, although you mentioned at the June 2 WSAG meeting that the cost would only be a little more than \$3 million.)

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